PIPE* Workshop: Gregory DeAngelo, Claremont Graduate University

Policing for Profit: The Political Economy of Law Enforcement

In recent years numerous observers have raised concerns about "policing for profit'' or the deployment of law enforcement resources to raise funds for cash-strapped jurisdictions. However, identifying the causal effect of fiscal incentives on law enforcement behavior has remained elusive. We model the effects of fiscal incentives on traffic safety enforcement, finding that rules allocating a greater share of fine revenues to deploying jurisdictions may induce increased enforcement effort by patrol officers, and consequent reductions in unsafe driving behavior, with only indeterminate effects on the frequency of citations. We test this model using citation and accident data from Saskatchewan, Canada between 1990 and 2017, for towns policed under the province's contract with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Gregory DeAngelo is an associate professor in the Department of Economic Sciences at Claremont Graduate University. His research ranges from the identification of the effect of judicial and prosecutorial incentives on the outcomes of criminal cases to the impact of law enforcement strategies on human trafficking.

*Political Institutions and Political Economy